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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRED N. HOBSON and MARY
HOBSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
- vs-

PANGUITCH LAKE
CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Defendants, Third-Party
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
- vs DERRAL CHRISTENSEN, ET AL.,
Third-Party Defendants, Fourth
Party Plaintiffs, and Respondents,
- vsDELLA D. MARSDEN, ET AL.,
Fourth-Party Defendants
and Respondents.

Case No.
13615

BRIEF OF HOBSON RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These Respondents (hereinafter referred to as "HOBSONS") brought this action against Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "PANGUITCH LAKE CORPORATION") to quiet title to a tract of land, the west boundary fence of which was torn down by Panguitch Lake
Corporation's president in an effort to reconstruct that
boundary to embrace the disputed tract within the latter's
fence. In response to Hobson's lawsuit Panguitch Lake
Corporation counterclaimed for a Decree quieting title
in it.
1
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Hobsons are not affected by, and their brief will not
deal with, any of the disputes between the Third and
Fourth Party Defendants, all of whom also appear as Respondents.
DISPOSITION I N THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court found that the predecessors in title
to Panguitch Lake Corporation with Hobsons' approval
had established the common boundary upon such courses
and distances as entitled Hobsons to a Decree awarding
them the disputed tract.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Hobsons ask that the Decree quieting title in them
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1958 Fred Hobson bought two forty-acre tracts
from William L. Marsden and Delia D. Marsden (R. 236)
They are marked Tract 1 and Tract 2 on the plat below.
The schematic drawing at page 3 of Appellants' brief
is substantially correct but the northern and southern
protrusions are exaggerated and extend into lands which
do not influence, and are not affected by, this litigation
so we have eliminated them from the reproduction below.
The cross-hatched area roughly outlines the tract in dispute and is a part of the Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 31. The Marsden-Hobson fenceline forms the West (diagonal) border of it.
1
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Section 31, Township 35 South, Range 7 West
N

3

1

Panguitchf

Lake

f

2

1
Hobson

s
Hobson met with Mr. and Mrs. Marsden together
each time any purchase was discussed or transacted (R.
254, 268, 270, 274, 297). William Marsden represented
to Hobson, with Mrs. Marsden present, that he, William
Marsden, owned the land at the time of Hobson's negotiations to buy it (R. 252).
At the trial it was stipulated that Mr. and Mrs. Marsden owned tracts 1 and 3 at all times material to these proceedings (R. 293-295) effectively disposing of the claim
that Delia Marsden alone was the owner when the fence
was constructed under direction of William Marsden.
{This fact will be established by the evidence in treatment of Panguitch Lake Corporation's Point I under our
"Argument"}
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Hobson didn't know where any of the corners or
boundary lines were (R. 248) and told Marsden it was
necessary that he know "right where my corners are going
to be" (R. 146). Hobson wanted to get a surveyor but
Marsden declined, saying that he "knew his land well"
(R. 146).
As Panguitch Lake Corporation acknowledges in its
brief at Pages 4 and 5 a third party, Ralph Reynolds, took
directions from Mr. Marsden who showed Reynolds where
the west boundary of Hobson's acquisition was to be and
where the common boundary between the parties was to
be established and marked on the ground by the fence
(R. 140-225).
The boundary thus delineated is the diagonal (west)
boundary on the sketch shown above.
Mr. Marsden marked the west boundary of the Hobson property, directed the third party (Ralph Reynolds)
where to drive the stakes and when the last stake along the
north-south common boundary was driven Hobson and
Marsden agreed completely that this would be the boundary (R. 185).
A substantial fence was constructed taking several
weeks to complete after expensive materials were hauled
into the the rather remote site (R. 185-188, 276). This
fence became the anchor line for a mountain subdivision
which Hobson established at considerable expense by a
survey laid out and staked on the ground (R. 400) relying
on and using the Marsden-established line as the west

4
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boundary of Hobson's acquisition (R. 258, 259, 379, 383).
Hobson, based upon these references to the established
fence boundary, entered into contracts to sell lots and in
selling lots showed the buyers "the ground" as it was
staked in accordance with the subdivision plat which used
the fence as the west boundary (R. 400, 401) but conveyed
only two lots which was done prior to Panguitch Lake Corporation taking down his fence (R. 401, 403, 404). Hobson paid taxes based on increased assessment (R. 402) and
levy notices sent to him describing lots that were situated
within this disputed tract of land (R. 265, 290, 403) and
the fence remained on the Marsden-established course and
boundary for a period of ten years until in 1968 when
Oliver LeFevre unilaterally and without any notice to
Hobson tore the fence down (R. 353, 354) after acquiring
the forty-acre tract west of the fence from successors in
interest of Marsden.
Delia Marsden testified that she and her husband
were horseback riding in the area two or three years after
the fence was constructed and her husband "saw the fence
and {said he} didn't like it" and he "wanted to get a
surveyor up there and have the fence removed". She claims
he did obtain the services of a surveyor for that purpose
(R. 302); however, nothing was done by Marsden to attempt to re-establish the fence nor was anything done by
Marsdens' purchasers who acquired the adjoining tract of
land under an escrow agreement in 1964 (R. 304). He
never mentioned the problem to Hobson (R. 384) nor did
his wife (R. 386).

5
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In June 1968 following the destruction by Panguitch
Lake Corporation of Hobsons' west boundary fence, Hobson met Oliver LeFevre, President of Panguitch Lake Corporation, at the site. Mr. Hobson was told the fenceline
was not conforming to the sixteenth-quarter ("forty-acre"
tract) line. He was told by a surveyor, David Bruce
Whited, that there was a discrepancy between surveys.
Whited asked the parties to agree that he was doing his
surveying correctly and that he (the surveyor) had found
the true boundary of the forty-acre tract (Lines 3-13, R.
335). Whited testified:
* * * I pointed out to them that there was this
discrepancy and that this discrepancy should be
agreed upon at this time so that I could proceed
with my survey.
#

•

•

Q Was discussion had between Mr. LeFevre and
Mr. Hobson about building a fence along that
line?
THE COURT: Now, you refer to what line?
MR. EYRE: The dark blue line.
A It was implied that there could have possibly
— they didn't specifically state this line. The
discussion that I heard was that the fence would
be put on the boundary line. (Emphasis added)
Mr. Hobson fairly stated exactly what took place (R.
261) in a statement which is consistent of the testimony
of all the other witnesses. He was asked:
Q Did you agree to assist Mr. LeFevre of Panguitch Lake Corporation putting in the fenceline in accordance with Mr. Whited's survey
line?

6
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A If that can be proven that that is correct, I
would do anything fair. I said the line on the
other side of the fence is mine but I also said
that the surveyor, if he says that's the line,
that's the line, but I didn't concede any land
on the other side of the fence that I bought from
William D. Marsden.
Q So, you didn't agree that that's where the
boundary line would be established and the
fence placed?
A N o siree.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
I T IS IMMATERIAL T H A T DELLA D. MARSDEN MAY HAVE RECEIVED A CONVEYANCE ON TRACTS 1 AND 3 BECAUSE —
A.

B.

ALL PARTIES STIPULATED T H A T
BOTH WILLIAM AND DELLA MARSDEN OWNED THE LANDS AT ALL
MATERIAL TIMES
AND
WILLIAM MARSDEN ACTED FOR
HIMSELF AND HIS WIFE W I T H HER
AUTHORITY IN ESTABLISHING A
BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT

The claim that Delia Marsden was the owner of
Tracts 1 and 3 when her husband marked off and agreed
to the boundary by parol with Fred Hobson is an afterthought. It cannot be supported by the facts, as we will
demonstrate under sub-point B, but was effectively destroyed by pleadings and stipulation of all parties claiming adversely to Hobsons in this lawsuit.

7
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A.

ALL PARTIES STIPULATED T H A T
BOTH WILLIAM A N D DELLA MARSDEN O W N E D THE LANDS A T ALL
MATERIAL TIMES

The boundary was adopted by agreement of Marsden
and Hobson in 1958 (R. 140 et. seq.). The pleadings at
Page 58 of the record contain allegations not controverted by any person that the "Panguitch Lake Tract" (Parcel
3) was purchased in 1964 from William and Delia Marsden (Lines 3-6) and that after the fence in question was
constructed William and Delia Marsden did vigorously
object thereto and hired a surveyor to conform where their
boundary line was (Lines 13-15). Marsden's counsel
answers the Fourth Party Complaint by referring to the
land in question as "Fourth Party Defendants' [Mr. and
Mrs. Marsden's} property" (R. 82).
Transcendental to all this is a stipulation entered into
by all parties found at R. 293-295 immediately prior to
resting the Plaintiffs' case which is as follows:
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Just a minute, this will
make a difference in the rest of my case. I will
have to call some one of your parties who is here
to establish who was the record owner of the
northwest quarter of the southwest quarter of this
Section 31, in 1958, either that or I'd like leave of
the Court to get some certified copies of recorded
instruments from the County Recorder's Office.
Now, I understand from one of you or some of you
that that property was in the name of William L.
Marsden or Delia Marsden.
MR. EYRE:

We'll stipulate to that.

MR. WADDINGHAM: Now, what do you want?

8
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MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
Hobson.

The forty just west of

MR. EYRE: It actually wasn't the full forty, but
the east thirty rods of it was. I'll stipulate to that
in behalf of my client {Panguitch Lake Corporation}.
THE COURT: The east thirty rods of the area
that lies west of the forty?
MR. EYRE:

Yes.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: So that — do we have
that stipulation completely from all counsel that
the —
MR. WADDINGHAM: We will stipulate that
the property was purchased by these parties if that
is the property we're talking about that was in the
name of William and Delia.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Delia Marsden.

MR. WADDINGHAM: I don't know if it was in
their names as joint tenants or how it was vested
but it was in both names.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: In August and September of 1958, is that correct?
MR. EYRE:
to it.

That's correct. We will stipulate

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: If that's true, then I
won't have any other questions of Mr. Hobson.
•

*

*

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Then with the stipulation that the property lying immediately west of
that in dispute and including the property in dispute, that constitutes the northwest quarter of the
southwest quarter of Section 31, in this township
and range, and that on September, at the time criti9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cal to this litigation, in August and September
1958, that was vested in the names of William L.
Marsden and Delia D. Marsden, provided that that
is the stipulation, then the Plaintiff rests.
THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN: The Plaintiffs rest on
the issue of title to the disputed fact question.
The deed referred to in the first paragraph of Page
4 of Appellants' brief was never in the record nor introduced in evidence but was attached to a brief filed by Panguitch Lake Corporation after the trial (R. 107-122).

B.

WILLIAM MARSDEN ACTED FOR HIMSELF A N D HIS WIFE W I T H HER AUT H O R I T Y IN E S T A B L I S H I N G A
BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT

Mrs. Marsden appeared at the trial and testified as
follows:
{This examination is by her own counsel}
R. 297 He {Mr. Marsden} said to me, "Look at
that line," and I said, "What's the matter
with it"? "Well," he said, "It is extended onto our property five or six miles
(sic)," and I said, "Well, I can see it is
out," so he said, "Would you like to ride
up to the next corner?"
R. 302

"Well, I certainly didn't indicate that he
could have that little five acres because
at that time we were selling little plots
all over on the east side for much more
money so he mentioned he would get
Brownie Piatt up, which he did, and they
were up there all day surveying that
property."
10
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R. 309

Well, I very well recall my husband saying that the land wasn't on the right line
but I don't know that we had ever discussed it with Mr. Hobson. The only
thing I know is that he had {her husband} had it surveyed and he wanted it
moved.

Even more critical is the way the parties regarded
ownership of the property, or whatever interests they continued to retain, in the property west of the land deeded
to Hobson:
R. 302

* * * at that same time we were selling
little plots all over the east side for much
more money, so he {her husband} mentioned he would get Brownie Piatt up
which he did, and they {Mr. Marsden and
Piatt} were out there all day surveying
that property.

Mrs. Marsden still regarded Mr. Marsden as the
owner in fact of the property as well as her agent in respect of any rights which she may have had. At R. 311
she was asked by her own attorney:
Q Mrs. Marsden, following his examination of the
fence, did your husband do anything to require Mr. Hobson to remove the fence?
A Well, due to the fact that he was ailing, he
didn't follow things through quite so much
and I couldn't tell you.
In other words Mrs. Marsden claimed in her testimony that the reason nothing was done about the fence
during the period following 1958 (when the fence was
constructed) was because her husband was "ailing". How
11
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can she deny that he was her agent and she was dependent
upon him for complete management of her property while,
at the same time, representing to the Court that there
was an excuse in not doing anything about the fence because of Mr. Marsden's illness?
At Page 306 the fact of Mr. Marsden's continuing
ownership of the property or agency for Mrs. Marsden is
even more apparent:
Q When you were living in south Ogden, were
you contacted by Mr. Thorpe Waddingham and
other persons regarding the sale of property
directly west of Hobson's property?
A Well, we had quite a bit of ground there at that
time and we knew he never could go back to
do anything with his livestock and so we were
anxious to get rid of it, really. It was a detriment and things run down if you're not there
and there were two or three people who wanted
that ground. Mr. Waddingham had mentioned
that he liked the property and he sent Mr.
Christensen up to Ogden and we sold the property. [This is the tract west of the disputed area
and Waddingham and Christensen claimed
(and Panguitch Lake claims under them) title
to the disputed tract.}
R. 307:
Q Was there any question particularly with regard to the fenceline that had been placed on
the property west boundary by Mr. Hobson?
A Well, naturally, my husband was very honest
and he didn't want to sell this property without
they understand this disputed line, so he told
them that there were five acres of our choicest
pasture ground which was fenced within the
12
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boundaries of Mr. Hobson's land and Mr.
Christensen said, "Oh, that's alright. We'll
go burn that fence down."
POINT

II

TITLE T O THE DISPUTED LAND WAS
PROPERTY QUIETED IN HOBSONS BY THE
TRIAL COURT BECAUSE HOBSON'S TITLE
WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY PAROL
Immediately after Hobsons' acquisition William
Marsden located the boundary on which the fenceline was
built by directing a third party (Ralph Reynolds) where
to stake off the line (R. 140-225) on which line Hobson
built the fence (R. 185-188, 246, 276).
At the time this fenceline was located, Hobson did
not know where the true west boundary of his acquisition
was (R. 248, 290) and neither did Marsden because he
located the line trending southwesterly rather than due
south (see foregoing plat)*
After Marsden had directed Hobson's employee
where to place the stakes, both parties agreed this would
be the boundary (R. 185, 242).
Brown vs. Milliner, 120 U 16, 232 P2d 202, in a
comprehensive opinion by Chief Justice Wolfe reviewing
the history of the rule states:
A review of the Utah cases involving boundary disputes reveals that it has long been recognized in
this state that when the location of the true boundary between two adjoining tracts of land is un13
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known, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof
may, by parol agreement, establish the boundary
line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and
their grantees.
The decision then quotes Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37
U 99, 107 P 25 and Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 U 57, 267 P 912,
69 ALR 1417.
That case goes on to hold further that a boundary
by agreement will be presumed by long use or acquiescence in a fence.
This case has been affirmed and cited with approval
for the first proposition in all of the following cases:
Willie vs. Local Realty Co., 175 P2d 718 {175 P2d at
723}, 110 Utah 523
(Cites Tripp vs. Bagley that one of the requisites
necessary to the establishment of a boundary line
other than the true boundary line between adjoining landowners is by oral agreement or acquiescence.)
Ekberg vs. Bates, 239 P2d 205, 121 U 122
Hummel vs. Young, 265 P2d 410, 1 U2d 237
Ringwood

vs. Bradford, 269 P2d 1053, 2 U2d 119

(Holding that if no such agreement can be proved,
then such an agreement will be implied by long
acquiescence)
Jensen vs. Bartlett, 286 P2d 804, 4 U2d 58

14
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To attach the requirement of acquiescence to the rule
of boundary by agreement announced in those landmark
cases is an absurd extention of the rule because boundary
by long acquiescence does no more than to create a presumption that an agreement existed. If an agreement cannot establish a boundary, then upon what theory can
acquiescence create a presumption that an agreement has
been honored over a long period of time?
In 3 Utah Law Review at Page 504 there is a statement to the effect that:
There is a theoretical argument against acquiescence as a requirement since in the law of boundary by acquiescence, the line established is held
to be binding on adjoining land owners when an
agreement is "implied" and unrebutted. The existence of an actual agreement should be sufficient
in itself to bind the parties to the determined
property."
The note goes on to say that a persuasive practical
argument against this theory can be made; however, an
examination of that theory will show that it is neither
persuasive nor practical because it only states that landowners could, by an act of collusion, avoid the Statute of
Frauds.
These important cases of Brown vs. Milliner, Rydalch
vs. Anderson and Tripp vs. Bagley all destroy that theory
since boundary by mutual agreement is not a transfer of
land but an agreement establishing the respective estates
of the adjoining proprietors.

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Panguitch Lake Corporation relies on the statement
by Mr. Chief Justice Callister concurring in the result in
Davis vs. Riley, 20 U2d 325, 437 P2d 453; however,
Counsel has misinterpreted His Honor's statement which
is as follows:
This doctrine (of boundary by acquiescence} is
premised on either an express parol agreement by
adjoining owners fixing the boundary or the court
will imply such an agreement by indulging in the
fiction that at some time in the past adjoining owners were in dispute or uncertain as to the location
of the true boundaries and they settled their differences by agreeing upon the fence or other monument as the dividing line between their properties.
In Hummel vs. Young, 1 U2d 237, 265 P2d 410,
Justice Crockett appropriately concurred in the result by
agreeing that an express contract is not necessary to the
establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence, a clear
holding that the period of long acquiescence supplies a
deficiency in an effort to prove boundary by parol (such
as lack of uncertainty, unavailability of parties to agree,
etc.)
Beginning at Page 15 of its brief, Panguitch Lake
Corporation agrees as sort of a subsidiary — though not
identified — proposition that the 1958 fence line was
established by mistake—both parties mistakenly believing they were on the true boundary. That theory is disposed of by Nunley vs. Walker, 369 P2d 117, 13 U2d 105,
holding that a boundary will be established by agreement
even though the parties could have ascertained the true
boundary by a survey but did not. See also Hummel vs.
Young 1 U2d 237, 265 P2d 410 and Motzkus vs. Carroll,
7
U2d237,322P2d391.
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Mr. Justice Henriod expressed the arch-type case
which fits this situation:
It is significant that in most cases, a physical, visible means of marking the boundary was effected at
a time when it was cheaper to risk the mistake of
a few feet rather than to argue about it, go to the
court, or indulge the luxury of a survey, pursuance
of any of which motives might have proven more
costly than the possible and most expedient sacrifice of the small land area.
This is precisely Mr. Marsden's predicament.
The Trial Court believed (and there was absolutely
no evidence to the contrary) that Marsden established this
boundary line; Marsden and Hobson agreed to it, shook
hands upon it, and Hobson relied on it to his tremendously
devastating damage if it is now changed, by building a
substantial fence which stood for ten years, tying an expensive subdivision to it, and selling lots to innocent third
persons (on contract) out of it.
If Hobsons do not prevail in this action, those individuals can sue Hobsons for substantial damages if he is
unable to perform under those contracts.

POINT

III

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND
THAT NO ORAL AGREEMENT EXISTED TO
TRANSFER TITLE FROM HOBSONS TO
PANGUITCH LAKE
The Court in the last part of Finding No. 9 and Finding No. 10 made this ruling:
17
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{R. 94]
# 9 * * * The west boundary of said tract was
established by act of the parties in 1958 and by the
express consent and agreement of William Marsden
w h o * * * directing Ralph Reynolds to establish
stakes in the ground marking the course and distance of the west boundary of the tract sold along
which course Hobsons subsequently constructed a
fence which fence remained in that position until
the same was destroyed without authority and by
the wrongful act of Oliver LeFevre.
#10:
The Court finds that all subsequent conduct on
the part of the Plaintiffs and successors in interest
of Marsden did not constitute a reconveyance of the
disputed tract of land nor did any of those acts or
that conduct serve to relocate the fence nor authorize a re-establishment of the west boundary of the
Hobson tract nor did it effect any rescission of the
boundary line established and created by the act
of the parties in 1958 {Emphasis added}
Panguitch Lake Corporation contends that this is in
essence a conclusion of law. This is contrary to the express language of the finding where the Court says that the
subsequent conduct did not serve to relocate the fence and
there were no facts by which there was authorized a reestablishment of the west boundary. In other words the
Court accepted the version of Hobson that he did not authorize a change in the boundary by any statement, act or
conduct. The Trial Court also accepted the statement of
the surveyor, Whited, that the parties agreed that the
survey was proceeding correctly and that the surveyor was
accurately marking the west boundary of the forty-acre
tract (R. 336). "They didn't specifically state this line (the
18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"40" boundary). The discussion that I heard was that the
fence would be put on the boundary line". [The fence
had been torn down — Hobson wanted it put back up on
the legal boundary — conceding nothing over the fence.}
(R.261).
Here in the year 1968 there was absolutely no doubt
concerning application of these various descriptions to
the physical features on the ground. It was not a situation
where they needed the services of a surveyor. A surveyor
was there (R. 260-68). The interest of Hobson in the
disputed tract became vested in 1958 when he and Marsden established that boundary by parol. Nothing was left
to dispute about that nor was the location of the fenceline
uncertain. The parties were standing on it. If the surveyor pointed out that this fence was not on the line, then
this did not raise an uncertainty or a dispute as to the ultimate fact, i.e.: there was nothing requiring any agreement between the parties in 1968 as to an uncertainty or
a dispute. Under these circumstances if Hobson had desired to convey the disputed tract back to Panguitch Lake
Corporation he would have been required to do so in
compliance with the Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
See Carter vs. Lindner, 460 P2d 830, 23 U2d 204.
See also Motzkus vs. Carroll, 322 P2d 391, 7 U2d
237. This case holds subordinately (1) as a long period of
acquiescence is established it is not necessary to prove also
that the location of the true boundary was unknown, uncertain or in dispute [Thus distinguishing very clearly the
two separate theories}. And holds pre-eminently (2) that
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where a boundary line has been established and rights
vested prior to a survey, whether that establishment took
place in 7 or 20 years or immediately, it is immaterial
that a person then owning the disputed tract may consent
to the removal of the fence or does not protest when the
surveyor shows where he located the boundary line, for
such knowledge does not nullify the establishment of a
boundary line by acquiescence or agreement which had
been completed before the survey.
If the evidence taken as a whole can be susceptible
of opposite conclusions as to the existence or non-existence
of a determinative fact or the weight to be given the testimony of witnesses, the reviewing Court will conclusively
presume the fact to be such as will support the ruling it
is called upon to review. Pollesche vs. Trans-American
Insurance Co., 497 P2d 236, 27 U2d 430.
The Trial Court had the option to conclude from the
evidence that Fred Hobson never agreed in 1968 that the
fence could be removed from the location where he had
placed it and the only interpretation the Court could
possibly have placed on his statement was that if the law
required him to remove the fence, then it should be placed
on the line fixed by the licensed surveyor (R. 261).
Even if the Court indulged the presumption or indulged in the speculation that Hobson entered into an
agreement to move the fenceline, then that would not
comport with the requirements of boundary by parol for
the reason that there was no dispute as to the relationship
of legal descriptions to physical features of the land.
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To illustrate this, the reason for boundary by parol,
as expressed by Justice Henroid in King vs. Fronk, 14
U2d 135, 378 P2d 893, is that the parties wished to avoid
the expense and inconvenience and delay of obtaining a
professional surveyor or to obtain the scientifically established and certain method of determining where the
boundary line is or should be marked on the ground. It is
never invoked (the rule of boundary by parol) because
the descriptions in the deeds, conveyances, patents, or
other muniments of title are uncertain. It is only invoked
because of difficulty in applying those descriptions employed in muniments of title to the ground itself. Thus,
when individuals agree on a boundary line and
bind themselves and their successors to it {Brown vs.
Milliner, 120 U 16, 232 P2d 202) they are, in effect, making a practical, contemporaneous, interpretation or construction of their instruments of title which themselves are
clear but which may mean two or more different things
when translated to actual, physical establishment of a
boundary (R. 261).
The Court made an express finding that Hobson
never authorized or agreed to a new boundary (Finding
No. 10, R. 94). Even if we were to indulge Panguitch
Lake Corporation's characterization of that finding as a
"conclusion" nevertheless the judgment should be sustained where there is evidence to support that conclusion.
Crissey vs. State Highway Commission, 413 P2d 308, 147
Mont. 374, holds that a reviewing court will imply findings necessary to support a conclusion so long as those
they imply are not inconsistent with findings expressly
made.
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This Court in Aiken vs. Less Taylor Motor Co., 110
V 265, 171 P2d 676, held:
Whether or not a new agreement fof lease] was
made we do not know. Lessor contends it was.
Lessee denies making any new tenancy agreement.
The trial court made no finding of fact specifically
on the question. The court determined that the
lessee was in possession under the lease so renewed. From that determination it may be inferred
that the court did not agree with the lessor that a
new agreement was made or if made that it affected the renewed lease.
Whenever, from facts found, other facts may be inferred which will support the judgment, such inferences
will be deemed to have been drawn by the Trial Court.
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. vs. FTC (CA 7th) 168 F2d
175 (affd. 336 US 956, 69 SCt. 888, 93 L.Ed. 1110).
Furthermore, Panguitch Lake Corporation (and all
those others claiming adversely to Hobson) specifically requested the Court to make a finding that a parol agreement was reached in June 1968 and to find expressly that
Hobson agreed to establishment of a new boundary along
the line which Whited said was "splitting the difference"
between the two professional surveys (R. 100, par. 5; R.
104, par. 5). The Court refused to make these findings
after a hearing held upon the motion (R. 124, 125).
Refusal of the Trial Court to adopt requested findings
must be regarded on appeal as a finding against the party
who requested the findings. (Gallegos vs. War, 78 N.M.
796, 438 P2d 636).
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Additionally, Panguitch Lake Corporation had the
burden of proving boundary by parol under their claim
that one occurred in 1968 (Universal Investment Co. vs.
Kingsbury, 26 U2d 35, 484 P2d 173) and if there were a
failure of the Trial Court to make a finding upon the issue
(which we dispute because the Court found expressly
against Panguitch Lake on the issue) on review that failure
would be regarded as a negative finding against Panguitch Lake. The failure of a Trial Court to make a finding upon an issue, the burden of proving which is upon a
party, is in effect a negative factual finding on that issue.
Ingle vs. Ingle, 183 Wash. 234, 48 P2d 576.
In First Western Fidelity vs. Gibbons and Reed Co.,
27 U2d 1, 492 P2d 132, Justice Crockett held:
In addition to and supplementing the usual rule
of review on appeal, that we survey the evidence in
the light favorable to the Trial Court's findings,
this further comment is applicable here. Where
the appellant's position is that the Trial Court
erred in refusing to make certain findings essential
to its right to recover, and insists that the evidence
compels such findings, it is obliged to show that
there is credible and uncontradicted evidence
which proves those contended facts with such certainty that all reasonable minds must so find. Conversely, if there is any reasonable basis, either in
the evidence or from the lack of evidence upon
which reasonable minds might conclude that they
are not so convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence, then the findings should not be overturned.
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CONCLUSION
W e believe this eminent statement of the scope and
effect of review applies to all the findings of the Trial
Court. Panguitch Lake Corporation has failed, and can
only fail because of the record, to demonstrate any finding
or any conduct on the part of the Trial Court in refusing
to find any facts where the Trial Court's action was not
supported by substantial evidence. Nor can Panguitch
Lake Corporation show any error of the Trial Court in
applying the law to the findings and conclusions thus
made and the judgment in favor of Hobson must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Ken Chamberlain
Olsen and Chamberlain
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Attorneys for Plaintiff $
and Hobson Respondents
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